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Abstract
We investigate theoretically and empirically how exporters adjust their markups across destina-
tions depending on bilateral distance, tari¤s, and the quality of their exports. Under the assumption
that trade costs are both ad valorem and per unit, our model predicts that markups rise with dis-
tance and fall with tari¤s, but these e¤ects are heterogeneous and are smaller in magnitude for
higher quality exports. We …nd strong support for the predictions of the model using a unique
data set of Argentinean …rm-level wine exports combined with experts wine ratings as a measure of
quality.
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1 Introduction
One robust …nding in the empirical trade literature shows that exporters set higher Free on Board
(FOB) export prices in more distant countries. This empirical regularity can be explained by several
theoretical mechanisms. A …rst mechanism is a composition e¤ect, also known as the Alchian and Allen
(1964) e¤ect, which arises due to the existence of per unit trade costs which lower the relative price,
and increase the relative demand for higher quality goods in more distant countries. As higher quality
goods are more expensive, …rm-level prices increase with distance. A second mechanism is a selection
e¤ect which occurs if …rms …nd it pro…table to export higher quality varieties to more distant markets
only, resulting in quality sorting. The exit of cheap and lower quality exports in more distant markets
implies that, on average, export prices rise with distance. Lastly, …rms may price discriminate and
charge higher markups and therefore higher prices when exporting to more distant countries.12
Recent empirical work con…rms that …rm-level markups are indeed variable. For instance, they
respond to trade liberalization (De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, 2016), exchange
rate ‡uctuations (Berman, Martin, and Mayer, 2012), they vary with per capita income (Simonovska,
2015), and with …rm-level characteristics (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012).3 Surprisingly, there is no
evidence on how …rm-level markups vary across destinations depending on trade costs such as bilateral
distance or tari¤s. Nor is there any evidence on how product quality shapes the response of markups
to changes in trade costs.
We …ll these gaps by exploring theoretically and empirically how exporters adjust their markups
across destinations depending on distance, ad valorem tari¤s, and the quality of their exports. Our
model shows that for a given quality, markups rise with distance and fall with tari¤s. These e¤ects,
however, are smaller in magnitude for higher quality exports. We …nd strong support for the predictions
of the model using a unique data set of Argentinean …rm-level wine exports combined with experts
wine ratings as a measure of quality (Chen and Juvenal, 2016, 2018; Crozet, Head, and Mayer, 2012).
Our paper is thus the …rst to establish that distance and tari¤s impact markups across international
markets, and that their e¤ects are heterogeneous across quality levels.
Our …rst contribution is to model theoretically the e¤ects of trade costs on the pricing strategies of
exporters across destinations. We extend the monopolistic competition model of Martin (2012) where
exporters maximize pro…ts subject to a CES demand in each destination country. Trade costs are
1For evidence on Alchian and Allen (1964), see Emlinger and Lamani (2017), Hummels and Skiba (2004), and Takechi
(2015). On selection, see Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Bastos and Silva (2010), Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2012),
Harrigan, Ma, and Shlychkov (2015), and Johnson (2012). See, also, Görg, Halpern, and Muraközy (2017), Lugovskyy
and Skiba (2015, 2016), Manova and Zhang (2012), and Martin (2012). An older literature on spatial price discrimination
studies how …rms adjust their markups depending on the distance to the buyer (Greenhut, Ohta, and Sailors, 1985; Hoover,
1937). “Dumping” and “reverse dumping” arise if …rms charge lower or higher markups in more distant countries.
2Composition is a demand-side e¤ect, while selection and price discrimination are supply-side mechanisms. On the
supply side, …rms may also upgrade their quality for more distant countries (Martin, 2012). Higher quality goods would
then be disproportionately shipped at longer distances, resulting in …rm-level prices increasing with distance.
3See inter alia Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014, 2019), Atkin and Donaldson (2015), Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and
Warzynski (2014), Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2009), Chen and Juvenal (2016, 2018), and Fitzgerald and Haller (2014).
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both ad valorem and per unit, and the introduction of per unit trade costs generates variable markups
that depend on trade costs (Crozet et al., 2012; Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2015).4 The
model shows that for a given quality, export prices and markups increase with per unit trade costs,
and therefore with distance.5 It also shows that prices and markups fall with ad valorem trade costs,
and therefore with ad valorem tari¤s. As we assume that producing a higher quality entails higher
marginal costs, the model further predicts that the e¤ects of trade costs (i.e., distance and tari¤s) on
prices and markups are heterogeneous and are smaller in magnitude for higher quality exports.
Our predictions are driven by the introduction of per unit trade costs in the model as the latter
generate an elasticity of demand to the FOB price that depends on trade costs and quality (Crozet
et al., 2012; Irarrazabal et al., 2015; Martin, 2012). Speci…cally, the demand elasticity falls with per
unit costs, and therefore with distance, but it increases with ad valorem costs such as tari¤s, especially
for lower quality exports. To compensate for the lower demand they face due to higher trade costs,
exporters thus …nd it pro…table to raise their prices in more distant markets, to lower them in high-tari¤
countries, and to a larger extent for lower quality exports. Notably, these predictions are not speci…c
to our CES framework and we show that they continue to hold with alternative demand systems.
Our second contribution is to investigate empirically the e¤ects of trade costs on the prices and
markups of exports di¤erentiated by quality. Our …rm-level trade data set reports, for each export
transaction between 2002 and 2009, the name of the exporting …rm, the country of destination, the
date of shipment, the packaging type, the FOB value (in US dollars) and the volume (in liters) of
each wine exported. A crucial feature of our data set is that exports are reported at the individual
product level as each wine is identi…ed according to its name, grape (Chardonnay, Malbec, etc.), type
(white, red, or rosé), and vintage year. This level of detail is unique given that trade statistics are
generally reported for product categories de…ned at the Combined Nomenclature (CN) or Harmonized
System (HS) levels only (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Görg, Halpern, and Muraközy, 2017; Harrigan, Ma,
and Shlychkov, 2015; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Martin, 2012).
We rely on the value and the volume exported at the …rm-product-destination-time level to compute
FOB unit values as a proxy for export prices. Our unit values can plausibly be interpreted as prices
as they are de…ned at the individual product level. To measure the quality of each wine at the name-
grape-type-vintage year level, we rely on two well-known experts wine ratings, the Wine Spectator and
Robert Parker (Chen and Juvenal, 2016, 2018).6 Once we match the unit values from the customs
4Ad valorem (iceberg, or multiplicative) trade costs are applied as a percentage of the producer price per unit traded,
while per unit (additive, or speci…c) trade costs are de…ned as a constant cost per unit traded.
5Per unit costs rise with distance as they vary with origin and destination (Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2015).
6A large body of theoretical and empirical work shows that quality plays a key role as a determinant of global trade
‡ows and prices (Feenstra and Romalis, 2014; Hallak, 2006; Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hummels and Skiba, 2004;
Schott, 2004). As quality is unobserved, trade unit values are often used as a proxy. Recently, some papers have exploited
direct measures of product quality. Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman (2017) use artisan assessments for Egyptian rugs.
Chen and Juvenal (2016, 2018) use the same quality ratings for Argentinean wines as in this paper. Crozet et al. (2012)
use quality scores for Champagne. Emlinger and Lamani (2017) rely on the amount of time the eau-de-vie used to produce
Cognac spends in oak. Medina (2018) identi…es the quality of apparel products based on their composition of primary
materials. Other papers derive alternative measures of quality. Khandelwal (2010) compares exporters’ market shares
conditional on price to infer export quality. Piveteau and Smagghue (2019) estimate quality using trade data.
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data set with the quality ratings of the Wine Spectator which has the largest coverage of Argentinean
wines, we observe 237 multi-product wine producers shipping 8,361 di¤erent wines with heterogeneous
levels of quality. Our focus on wine producers implies that each wine is exported by a single …rm only.
For our purposes, our data set o¤ers several advantages. First, thanks to the granularity of our
data, we can compare the prices of a given product exported by a single producer at a given point in
time across destinations, holding quality constant. Second, we can identify the variation in markups
by controlling for product-time …xed e¤ects. As the product-time …xed e¤ects enable us to isolate
the variation in unit values across destinations for a given exporter and a given product at each point
in time, they control for selection and composition e¤ects across products within …rms. And since
product-speci…c marginal costs do not vary across destinations, the variation in unit values across
markets captures the variation in markups. Third, in contrast to papers relying on unit values as a
proxy for quality (Hallak, 2006; Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012), our external
measure of quality allows us to explore how …rms set their prices and markups across destinations
depending on the quality they export. Fourth, exports are reported FOB and therefore measure the
revenue received by exporters at the border, excluding transport costs, tari¤s, and distribution costs in
the importing country. Fifth, shipping fees for wine are based on the volume exported, while insurance
fees or tari¤s are proportional to value (Crozet et al., 2012). Consistent with the assumptions of our
model, wine exports are thus subject to both per unit and ad valorem trade costs (we provide evidence
that both types of trade costs are indeed pervasive in our data).7
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we show that …rm-level export prices increase
with distance and fall with tari¤s. On average, a doubling of distance increases prices by 2.74 percent,
while a doubling of tari¤s reduces them by 1.37 percent. Second, we demonstrate that the e¤ects
of distance and tari¤s on prices survive the inclusion of product-time …xed e¤ects. This speci…cation
therefore provides direct evidence that exporters raise their markups in more distant markets, and lower
them in high-tari¤ countries. On average, a doubling of distance increases markups by 1.47 percent,
while a doubling of tari¤s reduces them by 1.04 percent. Variable markups thus explain around half
of the impact of distance, and three-quarters of the e¤ect of tari¤s on the variation in within …rm
prices across destinations, the rest being due to selection or composition e¤ects across products within
…rms. Third, we show that the elasticities of markups with respect to distance and tari¤s are smaller in
magnitude for the wines of higher quality. At the 5 percentile of the quality distribution, markups rise
by 3.67 percent and fall by 2.73 percent in response to a doubling of distance and tari¤s, respectively,
while no changes are detected at the 95 percentile. Notably, our results continue to hold once we
control for alternative mechanisms such as the heterogeneous pricing-to-market behavior of exporters
or the extent of competition that each quality segment faces in foreign markets. They also remain
robust to a whole battery of sensitivity tests, and in particular to using alternative measures of quality,
di¤erent samples, and to instrumenting tari¤s and quality.
7See Bosker and Buringh (2019), Daudin, Héricourt, and Patureau (2018), Hummels and Skiba (2004), Irarrazabal et
al. (2015), Lashkaripour (2017), Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015), and Takechi (2015) for evidence on per unit trade costs.
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We then provide extensions to our main speci…cations. We show that the heterogeneous e¤ects of
trade costs on markups are stronger for exports to richer destinations. They are also predominantly
driven by the higher quality …rms, the larger …rms, and the exporters who own a large share of the
export market. As these high performance …rms tend to charge higher markups, they are better
able to adjust them across countries and quality levels in response to changes in trade costs. Next,
using data on the universe of Argentinean …rm-level manufacturing exports, we extend our analysis to
industries other than wine. As quality is unobserved, we estimate the quality of each 8-digit HS-level
product exported by each …rm to each country in each time period (Khandelwal, 2010). The level of
disaggregation of the data (at the HS level) prevents us from identifying the variation in markups, but
we …nd that trade costs have heterogeneous e¤ects on export prices di¤erentiated by quality. Finally,
we derive the predictions of our model for the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on export volumes across
quality levels, and we provide evidence that those predictions hold in our data set of wine exports.
Our results are important for several reasons. First, they provide strong evidence that the variation
in …rm-level export prices across markets is not only driven by quality di¤erences but also by markup
variation conditional on quality. Due to market power, …rms thus price discriminate across destinations.
But they also price discriminate more aggressively for lower quality exports. Second, as the markup of
a given product with a given quality varies across export markets depending on distance and tari¤s,
we conclude that trade costs play a key role in generating deviations from the Law of One Price. Trade
costs thus matter in explaining the degree of international market segmentation. Lastly, as our results
are mainly driven by the high performance …rms that contribute to the bulk of aggregate exports, we
expect our …ndings to matter in explaining aggregate export prices and markups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 de-
scribes the …rm-level exports data, quality ratings, macroeconomic indicators, and provides descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and our main results. Section 5 discusses
extensions. Section 6 o¤ers robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
The appendix provides additional results. Appendix A shows that both per unit and ad valorem
trade costs are present in our data. Appendix B discusses the predictions of our model using alternative
demand systems. Appendix C examines how the elasticity of demand to the FOB price varies with
trade costs and quality. Appendix D controls for selection bias across …rms. Appendix E explains the
estimation of quality for manufacturing exports. The sensitivity tests are reported in Appendix F.
2 The Model
We extend the monopolistic competition model of Martin (2012) where exporters maximize pro…ts
subject to a CES demand in each destination country.8 Trade costs are both ad valorem and per unit,
and the introduction of per unit trade costs generates variable markups that depend on trade costs.9
8The theoretical model is available in the Martin (2010) working paper.
9 In many models, including perfect competition models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), or monopolistic competition
models like Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003), markups do not vary with country-level characteristics such as trade costs.
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The model shows that for a given quality, export prices and markups rise with per unit costs (distance),
and fall with ad valorem costs (tari¤s).10 Quality is exogenous, but producing a higher quality entails
higher marginal costs as it requires sophisticated inputs, skilled workers, and specialized equipment
which are expensive. The e¤ects of trade costs on prices and markups are hence heterogeneous and are
smaller in magnitude for higher quality exports. For simplicity we assume that …rms produce a single
good, but we extend the framework to multi-product …rms in the empirical analysis.
2.1 Setup
Researchers typically model trade costs as ad valorem such that more expensive products are more
costly to trade. As in Martin (2012) we instead assume that trade costs  have the following structure:
 = 

 ¡  = (  ¡ 1)  +  (1)
where  and 

 are the Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF) and FOB prices of a monopolistically
competitive …rm  exporting to country , and   and  are the ad valorem and per unit components
of trade costs, respectively. Trade costs are ad valorem only if  is zero, while they are per unit only
if   is equal to one. As long as  is positive, trade costs are less than proportional to the FOB price.
The relationship between the CIF and FOB prices can be expressed as:
 (    ()) =  

 (      ()) +  (2)
where  () is the marginal cost of …rm  which increases with quality . Producing a higher quality
entails higher marginal costs because it requires higher quality and therefore more expensive inputs
(Crinò and Epifani, 2012; Feenstra and Romalis, 2014; Johnson, 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012;
Manova and Zhang, 2012; Verhoogen, 2008).11
When exporting to country , …rm  maximizes pro…ts  :
 =
h
 ¡  ()
i
 =
"Ã
 ¡ 
 
!
¡  ()
#
  (3)
where  is the quantity sold by …rm  in market  (which depends on 

 ).
The representative consumer in destination country  has preferences over the consumption of a
continuum of di¤erentiated varieties  given by:
() =
·Z
-
()
¡1
 ()
¡1
 
¸ 
¡1
 (4)
10Some models yield predictions for the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on export prices while assuming that markups
are invariant to trade costs. See Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), Hummels
and Skiba (2004), Johnson (2012), and Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015, 2016).
11For evidence that producing higher quality wines entails higher marginal costs, see Chen and Juvenal (2016). For
instance, the oak barrels in which higher quality wines mature are more costly than stainless-steel tanks.
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where   1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The set of available varieties is -.
Quality captures any intrinsic characteristic or taste preference that makes a variety more appealing
for a consumer given its price. Therefore, consumers love variety, but also quality.
The inverse CES demand faced by …rm  in country  is (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003):
 = 
¡ 1

 
¡1
  (5)
where  is a positive parameter (exogenous to the …rm) which is a function of the size and price index
of the destination country. A higher quality  shifts up the demand curve faced by the …rm.
When …rm  maximizes pro…ts in (3) subject to the demand in (5), the …rst order condition is:
 =

 ¡ 1 ( +   ())  (6)
This yields the FOB price:
 =
1
 ¡ 1
µ

 
+  ()
¶
 (7)
and the corresponding markup (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008):
 = 

 ¡  () =
1
 ¡ 1
µ

 
+  ()
¶
 (8)
As producing a higher quality entails higher marginal costs, a higher quality sells at a higher price with
a higher markup. In the standard case where trade costs are ad valorem only (i.e.,  = 0), the FOB
price and markup do not depend on trade costs. Instead, if trade costs are also per unit, the FOB
price and markup depend positively on per unit costs , and negatively on ad valorem costs  . If
trade costs are per unit only (i.e.,   = 1), the FOB price and markup increase with trade costs.
2.2 Trade Costs and Quality
We assume that  increases with distance while   is independent of distance but varies with ad
valorem tari¤s (Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Irarrazabal et al., 2015; Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2015). The
elasticities of the FOB price and markup with respect to  and   can therefore be interpreted as
elasticities with respect to distance and tari¤s, respectively.12 We calculate those elasticities and we
show how they vary with export quality.
In our model, the introduction of per unit trade costs is crucial for our predictions. In Appendix A
we replicate estimations from the literature to demonstrate that both per unit and ad valorem trade
12Assuming that distance only increases per unit trade costs, Irarrazabal et al. (2015) estimate that the elasticity of
  with respect to distance is equal to 0.23. Some papers instead assume that distance increases both per unit and
ad valorem trade costs but that the e¤ect of distance is larger for per unit costs such that   rises with distance
(Crozet et al., 2012; Feenstra and Romalis, 2014; Martin, 2012; Takechi, 2015). In our model, our predictions remain the
same whether we derive the elasticities of prices and markups with respect to   or  .
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costs matter in our data. We also show that trade costs become more per unit than ad valorem as
distance increases.
Per Unit Trade Costs Using equations (7) and (8), we derive the elasticities of the FOB price and
markup with respect to  :


 =
1³
1 + () 
´  0 (9)


 =
1³
1 + () 
´  0 (10)
The price and markup increase with per unit trade costs, and therefore with distance, but as marginal
costs increase with quality (i.e., 0 ()  0), the magnitude of the two elasticities falls with quality.
Prediction 1 The elasticities of the FOB price and markup with respect to bilateral distance are
positive, and their magnitude decreases with quality.
From an empirical point of view, Prediction 1 implies that in regressions that explain FOB prices
or markups, we expect the coe¢cient on distance to be positive, and the coe¢cient on the interaction
between distance and quality to be negative.
Ad Valorem Trade Costs The elasticities of the FOB price and markup with respect to   are:


 =
¡1³
1 + () 
´  0 (11)


 =
¡1³
1 + () 
´  0 (12)
The price and markup decrease with ad valorem trade costs, and therefore with tari¤s, but as marginal
costs increase with quality the magnitude of the two elasticities in (11) and (12) falls with quality.
Prediction 2 The elasticities of the FOB price and markup with respect to ad valorem tari¤s are
negative, and their magnitude decreases with quality.
When explaining FOB prices or markups, Prediction 2 implies that the coe¢cient on tari¤s should
be negative, and the coe¢cient on the interaction between tari¤s and quality should be positive.
Crozet et al. (2012), Irarrazabal et al. (2015), and Martin (2012) also show that the FOB price
(and markup) rises with per unit trade costs (and therefore with distance) and falls with ad valorem
costs (such as tari¤s). The prediction that the magnitude of the elasticities of the price and markup
with respect to distance and tari¤s falls with quality is, instead, novel.13
13Crozet et al. (2012) derive the elasticity of the FOB price with respect to quality and show that it falls with distance.
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2.3 Mechanisms
Our predictions are driven by the introduction of per unit trade costs in the model as the latter generate
an elasticity of demand to the FOB price that depends on trade costs and quality (Crozet et al., 2012;
Irarrazabal et al., 2015; Martin, 2012). The elasticity of demand to the FOB price  is given by:
 =
µ
1 +

 


¶ = ¡0@1 + 1
( ¡1)

1

+


( ¡1)()

1A  (13)
where  is the elasticity of demand to the CIF price which is equal to ¡. If trade costs are ad
valorem only ( = 0), the elasticities of demand to the FOB and to the CIF price are identical.
If trade costs are also per unit, the elasticity of  with respect to per unit trade costs (i.e.,
distance) is negative. Moreover, it increases with the FOB price, and therefore with marginal costs
 () and quality. As the demand in more distant markets is less elastic to changes in the FOB price,
exporters …nd it pro…table to raise their prices to compensate for the lower demand they face due to
higher transport costs (as foreign demand falls with the CIF price which depends on per unit trade
costs, see equations 5 and 6). But …rms raise their prices less for higher quality exports.
Instead, the elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs (i.e., tari¤s) is positive, and it
falls with the FOB price and quality. The demand faced by exporters in countries with higher tari¤s
is therefore more elastic to changes in the FOB price. To compensate for the lower demand they face
due to higher tari¤s (as tari¤s raise the CIF price which in turn lowers foreign demand), …rms reduce
their prices, but they reduce them less for higher quality exports.14
2.4 Alternative Demand Systems
The predictions of our model are driven by two mechanisms: (1) the elasticity of  with respect
to per unit trade costs is negative and increases with the FOB price (and with quality), and (2) the
elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs is positive and falls with the FOB price (and
with quality). We now discuss whether these mechanisms hold for preferences other than CES.
Irarrazabal et al. (2015) investigate whether the …rst mechanism holds for di¤erent types of prefer-
ences: (a) CES utility, (b) quadratic, non-separable utility (Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse, 2002), (c)
translog preferences (Feenstra, 2003), and (d) additively quasi-separable utility (Behrens and Murata,
2007). They show that the elasticity of  with respect to per unit trade costs is negative with CES.
Depending on some parameter values, it is also negative with translog and additively quasi-separable
14The elasticity of  with respect to per unit trade costs is negative and increases with the FOB price as


 


= ¡ 1¡   0 and     =   + 2  0. The elastic-
ity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs is positive and decreases with the FOB price as


 


=


 + 

 0 and


 

 


= ¡  + 2  0. See Appendix B.
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utility. Instead, it is positive with quadratic preferences. They also demonstrate that for all demand
systems, this elasticity increases with the FOB price.
We examine in Appendix B whether the second mechanism holds for each demand system. We show
that the elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs is positive in all cases. It decreases
with the FOB price when preferences are CES or translog, and with additively quasi-separable utility
but for some parameter values only. Instead, it increases with the FOB price when preferences are
quadratic. We therefore conclude that the predictions of our model are not speci…c to CES and can be
derived from alternative utility functions with the exception of quadratic preferences.
In Appendix C we estimate the elasticities of  with respect to per unit and ad valorem trade
costs and we examine how they vary with quality (as opposed to the FOB price). We show that the
elasticity of  with respect to per unit trade costs (distance) is negative and rises with quality, while
the elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs (tari¤s) is positive and falls with quality.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data set combines information from di¤erent sources: …rm-level customs data, wine experts quality
ratings, and macroeconomic indicators.
3.1 Customs Data
Firm-level exports are collected by the Argentinean customs and were purchased from a private vendor
called Nosis (Chen and Juvenal, 2016, 2018). For each transaction we observe the name of the exporting
…rm, the destination country, the shipment date, the 12-digit HS code, the FOB value (in US dollars)
and the volume (in liters) of each wine exported between 2002 and 2009.15 The main advantage of our
data set is its level of disaggregation as for each wine exported we observe its name, type (red, white,
or rosé), grape (Malbec, Chardonnay, etc.), and vintage year. The data set also reports the type of
packaging used for shipping. Wines are predominantly exported in boxes or bottles, but they are also
shipped in wooden barrels, glass, tin, or tetra pak containers. As prices and markups may vary with
the packaging type, we de…ne a wine “product” according to its name, grape, type, vintage year, and
container type (while we de…ne a “wine” based on its name, grape, type, and vintage year only). Our
sample thus includes 11,158 products corresponding to 8,361 di¤erent wines. If we aggregated our data
at the 12-digit HS level, we would instead only observe ten di¤erent product categories.
By dividing the value by the volume exported at the …rm-product-destination-time level, we com-
pute FOB unit values as a proxy for export prices. As we do not observe the currency of invoicing,
we measure unit values in US dollars per liter. The Datamyne, a private vendor of international trade
15Due to con…dentiality reasons, the customs o¢ce does not report the exporter’s name. Nosis therefore uses its own
market knowledge to identify a …rst, a second, and a third probable exporter. To identify the exporter’s identity we
collected from the Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura the name of the producer and of the wholesaler authorized to
export each wine, and we compared them against the probable exporters reported by Nosis.
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data, indeed reports that 88 percent of Argentinean wine exports (HS 2204) between 2005 and 2008
were priced in US dollars. Given that unit values are de…ned for positive exports only, our analysis
focuses on the intensive margin of adjustment (we deal with the extensive margin in Appendix D).
We argue that our unit values can plausibly be interpreted as prices. On the one hand, unit values
are de…ned at the individual product level. This means we can compare the unit values of a given
product exported by a given …rm at a given point in time across destinations, holding quality constant.
This is clearly an advantage over other commonly used trade data sets where unit values are de…ned
at the CN or HS levels, and therefore measure for each product category the average price of di¤erent
varieties with potentially heterogeneous levels of quality (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Görg et al., 2017;
Harrigan et al., 2015; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Martin, 2012). On the other hand, as the volume is
only reported in liters, the unit of measurement of our unit values is homogeneous across products.
We clean up the raw data in several ways. We only keep the FOB transactions and we exclude the
wines produced outside of Argentina. We only include wine producers in the sample such that each
wine is exported by a single …rm (wholesalers and retailers are excluded, but as we show in Section 6
our results remain robust to including intermediaries in the sample). We drop the shipments containing
less than 4.5 liters (the latter corresponds to six 75cl bottles) to discard commercial samples exported
for marketing and promotion. We omit a few observations where the vintage year reported is ahead
of the shipment year, and the cases where the value of exports is positive, but the volume is reported
as zero. We aggregate the data at quarterly frequency between 2002Q1 and 2009Q4. As we show in
Section 6, our results remain robust to aggregating the data at annual frequency. Finally, to eliminate
potential outliers, we calculate the median unit value charged by each exporter in each time period,
and we drop the observations for which the unit value exceeds 100 times the median, or falls below the
median divided by 100.
3.2 Quality
We measure quality using the time-invariant quality ratings published by the Wine Spectator and
Robert Parker (Chen and Juvenal, 2016, 2018). The wines are assessed in blind tastings, and the
ratings are given on a (50,100) scale according to the wine’s name, grape, type, and vintage year. A
larger score indicates a higher quality. Table 1 describes the two rating classi…cations.
Table 1: Quality Ratings
Wine Spectator (50,100) Robert Parker (50,100)
Great 95–100 Extraordinary 96–100
Outstanding 90–94 Outstanding 90–95
Very good 85–89 Above average/very good 80–89
Good 80–84 Average 70–79
Mediocre 75–79 Below average 60–69
Not recommended 50–74 Unacceptable 50–59
Notes: Both the Wine Spectator and Parker rating systems classify the quality scores into six di¤erent bins.
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When we match the wines from the customs data set with the quality ratings of the Wine Spectator
by name, type, grape, and vintage year, we end up with 237 producers exporting 8,361 wines (11,158
products) with 1,066 di¤erent names, three types, 24 grapes, and 22 vintage years (from 1977 to 2009).
The lowest rated wine receives a score of 55, and the highest a score of 97. When matching with the
Parker ratings, we only observe 2,960 wines (4,128 products) exported by 151 …rms (with 443 di¤erent
names, three types, 21 grapes, and 20 vintage years), and the scores vary between 72 and 98 (i.e., we
only observe four of the six bins listed in Table 1). The mean absolute di¤erence between the Wine
Spectator and Parker ratings is equal to 1.96, with a standard deviation of 3.19. Still, the two ratings
are positively correlated as Pearson’s correlation is equal to 0.53, while Kendall’s correlation index of
concordance is 0.36. We rely on the Wine Spectator for our main regressions because it has the largest
coverage of Argentinean wines. The Parker ratings are used as a robustness check only.
3.3 Macroeconomic Data
Bilateral distances (in kilometers) are from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter-
nationales (CEPII). We use the population-weighted great circle distance between the largest cities
of two countries. Bilateral ad valorem tari¤s for wine (HS 2204), at annual frequency, are obtained
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development TRAINS database. We use the ef-
fectively applied weighted average tari¤ rates expressed in percentage terms (our results are similar if
we use the e¤ectively applied simple average tari¤ rates). Annual PPP GDPs and GDPs per capita
(in constant 2011 US dollars) are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (measuring
real GDP and GDP per capita without any adjustment for PPP yields very similar results). Quarterly
nominal exchange rates are from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary
Fund. Each country’s total wine production and wine production and consumption per capita (in liters
and at annual frequency) are from Anderson and Nelgen (2011).
3.4 A First Glance at the Data
Our sample includes 237 exporters, 8,361 wines (11,158 products), and 95 destination countries between
2002Q1 and 2009Q4 (91,810 observations). It represents 69 percent of the total value of red, white,
and rosé wine exported over the period.
Table 2 summarizes our trade data by year, and shows that the number of exporters, wines, and
products increased threefold between 2002 and 2009. A total of 926 wines were exported by 70 di¤erent
…rms in 2002, while 191 …rms exported 2,677 di¤erent wines in 2009. The number of export markets
rose from 62 in 2002 to 77 in 2009. The mean number of exported wines and of destinations per …rm,
and the mean number of destinations per wine also increased over time (the number of observations,
…rms, destinations, and the mean number of destinations per …rm and per wine fell in 2009 due to the
global …nancial crisis, see Chen and Juvenal, 2018).
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics by quality bin of the Wine Spectator. “Good” and “Very
good” wines represent the largest share of the sample (in terms of number of observations, …rms, wines,
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Year Observations Firms Products Wines Destinations Wines Destinations Destinations
per …rm per …rm per wine
2002 3,548 70 1,159 926 62 33.3 16.2 6.4
2003 6,087 94 1,536 1,201 61 35.1 18.1 8.2
2004 8,104 123 1,827 1,443 66 33.1 18.9 9.4
2005 11,072 143 2,270 1,784 67 35.6 20.9 11.1
2006 14,026 166 2,713 2,132 77 39.0 20.7 11.5
2007 16,018 178 2,961 2,391 78 40.1 22.5 12.8
2008 17,130 196 2,996 2,508 80 43.0 21.8 12.8
2009 15,825 191 3,208 2,677 77 45.7 20.4 10.8
Notes: For each year in the sample, the table reports the number of observations, exporters, products, wines, and
destinations, and the mean number of wines per exporter, destinations per exporter, and destinations per wine.
products, destinations, and export share in the sample). Instead, “Great” and “Not recommended”
wines have the smallest coverages. “Great” wines are exported to fewer countries which are, on average,
richer. Consistent with quality sorting and the Alchian and Allen (1964) conjecture, “Great” wines are
also exported to more distant locations. Higher quality wines are on average more expensive, but the
correlation between unit values and quality in our sample is only 36 percent.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Quality Bin
Obs. Firms Products Wines Export Unit Dest. Distance GDP per
shares values capita
Great 201 7 53 44 0.11% 27.98 30 9,511 33,782
Outstanding 12,944 79 1,686 1,282 16.61% 12.42 81 8,873 31,192
Very good 36,379 147 3,416 2,488 44.00% 4.71 91 8,970 30,162
Good 36,638 181 4,823 3,577 34.11% 4.28 90 8,977 30,866
Mediocre 5,218 97 1,100 909 4.39% 3.91 80 8,897 33,012
Not recommended 430 26 80 61 0.78% 3.89 52 8,391 29,252
Notes: For each quality bin of the Wine Spectator, the table reports the number of observations, exporters, products,
wines, the export share (in %), the mean unit value (in US dollars per liter), the number of destinations, the mean distance
(in kilometers), and the mean income per capita of the destination countries (in PPP constant 2011 US dollars).
Table 4 describes our data by continent, and shows that North America is the main destination for
wine exports (in terms of number of exporters, wines, and share of exports). Compared to Europe or
Asia which have a similar income per capita, North America is indeed larger, sets lower tari¤s, and is
closer to Argentina. South America is the closest region and sets the lowest tari¤s, but it only imports
13 percent of wine exports as it also has a low GDP and GDP per capita. The export share to Africa
is negligible, but it is the smallest and poorest region and sets high tari¤s. Besides, tari¤s tend to rise
with distance (their correlation in our sample is 42 percent). Unit values tend to fall with tari¤s (their
correlation is ¡94 percent), but they do not vary strongly with the distance to each region. Continents
are, however, an imperfect proxy for distance (Argentina is for instance closer to North America than
to Africa, but the distance to Canada is 9,391 kilometers against 7,702 kilometers to Ghana).
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Continent
Obs. Firms Wines Export Unit Dest. Distance GDP per GDP Tari¤s
shares values capita
S. America 20,821 165 4,299 12.93% 5.98 11 2,612 10,895 1,020 3.86%
N. America 28,862 225 5,779 48.69% 5.71 20 7,983 35,913 7,770 5.53%
Africa 372 32 234 0.09% 3.91 8 8,493 6,546 131 25.81%
Europe 32,672 189 5,386 33.67% 5.29 36 11,602 38,590 1,240 28.67%
Asia 9,083 127 2,364 4.62% 5.84 20 17,066 32,689 2,500 19.68%
Notes: For each continent, the table reports the number of observations, exporters, wines, the export share (in %), the
mean unit value (in US dollars per liter), the number of destinations, and the mean distance (in kilometers), GDP per
capita (in PPP constant 2011 US dollars), GDP (in billion PPP constant 2011 US dollars), and tari¤ (in %).
Lastly, we regress (log) unit values on product-time and destination country dummy variables. As
the product-time …xed e¤ects identify the variation in markups, the country …xed e¤ects capture the
mean markup in each destination. Figure 1 plots the country …xed e¤ects against (log) distance. The
slope is equal to 0.027 (signi…cant at the one percent level). If distance doubles, markups increase by
1.9 percent on average (20027 ¡ 1). Markups are highest for Luxembourg (LUX) which is distant from
Argentina (and has a high GDP per capita), and low for Uruguay (URY) which is close to Argentina
(and has a low GDP per capita). They are, however, also low for Saint Lucia (LCA) and Belarus
(BLR) which are both relatively distant from Argentina (but they also have a low GDP per capita).16
Figure 1: Destination-speci…c mean markups against (log) distance.
4 Empirical Analysis
To test the predictions of our model, and establish how exporters adjust their prices and markups
across destinations depending on distance, tari¤s, and the quality of their exports, we estimate the
16Visual inspection of the data also provides evidence of price discrimination. If we focus on the wine product shipped
to the largest number of countries in a given quarter (35 countries in 2009Q2), its unit value in that quarter varies between
1.78 and 4.68 US dollars per liter for exports to Honduras (6,085 kilometers) and Belgium (11,305 kilometers). As the
marginal cost is the same across markets, the higher price for the more distant country indicates a higher markup.
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following reduced-form regression:
ln = 1 ln  + 2 ln  £  + 3 ln  + 4 ln  £ 
+5 + +  (14)
where  is the FOB unit value of wine product  exported by …rm  to country  in quarter  (in
US dollars per liter). The quality of wine , denoted by , is measured using the Wine Spectator
ratings. The distance  between Argentina and country , and the (annual) tari¤  imposed
by country  on wine imports from Argentina in quarter  are both interacted with quality (we use
the logarithm of one plus the tari¤ rate). As our model predicts that prices and markups rise with
distance and fall with tari¤s, especially for lower quality exports, we expect 1 + (2 £ )  0
with 2  0 (Prediction 1), and 3 + (4 £ )  0 with 4  0 (Prediction 2).
We also control for destination-speci…c characteristics  including (log) GDP, GDP per capita,
and remoteness, measured at annual frequency.17 We expect GDP per capita to be associated with
higher prices, re‡ecting that wealthier countries have a stronger preference for quality (Bastos and
Silva, 2010; Görg et al., 2017; Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2015; Manova and
Zhang, 2012; Martin, 2012). As unit values depend on average prices in each export market, they
should also be higher in remote locations which are less competitive and have higher prices (Martin,
2012). They should instead be lower in larger countries where there is tougher competition (Baldwin
and Harrigan, 2011; Görg et al., 2017; Harrigan et al., 2015; Martin, 2012).18
We perform within estimations and include product-time …xed e¤ects  (which are also …rm
speci…c). The direct e¤ect of quality therefore drops out from the regression. As the product-time
…xed e¤ects enable us to isolate the variation in unit values across destinations for a given exporter
and a given product at each point in time, they control for selection and composition e¤ects across
products within …rms. And since product-speci…c marginal costs do not vary across destinations, the
variation in unit values across markets identi…es the variation in markups.19 Robust standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the destination-time level (our results remain robust to multi-level clustering
by destination and …rm).
We then estimate a more stringent speci…cation:
ln = 1 ln  £  + 2 ln  £  + + +  (15)
where the …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects  control for factors such as the time-varying demand
or taste of a country for a …rm’s exports, or the existence of contracts negotiated by some exporters
17A country is remote if it is geographically isolated from other countries or is close to small countries but far away
from large economies. Remoteness is calculated as

 ()
¡1 (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011).
18Our results remain robust to including a dummy variable for the members of Mercosur (Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay,
and Venezuela) and its associate members (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname).
19Selection and composition imply that prices vary across markets because di¤erent wines are sold in di¤erent countries.
Price discrimination instead captures that prices vary across markets conditional on positive exports. By absorbing in each
quarter the wines shipped to a single country, the product-time …xed e¤ects thus control for selection and composition.
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in some destinations. They also absorb all destination-speci…c factors including distance, tari¤s, GDP,
GDP per capita, and remoteness.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In Section 4.1 we …rst revisit evidence from the prior
literature that …rm-level export prices rise with distance and fall with tari¤s. We then turn to our …rst
contribution and we show that variable markups matter in explaining the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s
on the variation in prices across markets. Our second contribution in Section 4.2 is to demonstrate
that the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on markups are smaller in magnitude for higher quality exports.
4.1 Homogeneous Trade Cost E¤ects
To identify the homogeneous e¤ects of bilateral distance and tari¤s, we estimate equation (14) but
we omit the two interaction terms with quality. Also, we replace the product-time …xed e¤ects with
…rm-time dummy variables, and we control for product characteristics by including grape, type, vintage
year, HS-level, packaging, and province of origin of the grapes …xed e¤ects. Fixed e¤ects for the wine
names are not included as they are collinear with the …rm …xed e¤ects (as each wine is exported by
one producer only). The …rm-time …xed e¤ects control for time-varying characteristics of the exporters
such as productivity, …rm size, or credit constraints. They also imply that we identify the variation in
unit values across products and destinations for a given exporter at a given point in time. The e¤ects
of distance and tari¤s on unit values can therefore be driven by selection across products within …rms,
Alchian and Allen (1964) e¤ects, and/or variable markups.
The results are reported in column (1) of Table 5. Unit values increase with distance and fall with
tari¤s (Görg et al., 2017; Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2016). Prices are higher in
richer and remote destinations, and lower in larger markets. Column (2) further controls for quality.
Higher quality wines are shipped at a higher price, as in equation (7). And for a given quality, prices
are higher in more distant countries, and lower in markets with higher tari¤s.
Column (3) includes product-time …xed e¤ects and quality drops out from the regression (the
coe¢cient on remoteness also turns insigni…cant). Notably, the distance coe¢cient remains positive
and the tari¤ coe¢cient negative. This speci…cation thus provides direct evidence that exporters set
higher markups in more distant locations, and lower markups in countries with higher tari¤s.
Compared to a value of 0.039 in column (2), the distance coe¢cient falls to 0.021 in column (3). If
distance doubles, prices and markups increase by 2.74 and 1.47 percent on average. Variable markups
thus contribute to around half of the impact of distance on the variation in within …rm prices across
markets, the other half being due to selection or composition e¤ects across products within …rms.
Likewise, the magnitude of the tari¤ coe¢cient falls from ¡0113 to ¡0086. If tari¤s double (from
their mean which is equal to 14.87 percent), prices and markups fall by 1.37 and 1.04 percent on
average. Markups thus explain three-quarters of the e¤ect of tari¤s on the variation in …rm-level prices
across markets, the rest being due to selection or composition e¤ects across products within …rms.20
20Our model predicts that the elasticities with respect to distance and tari¤s are smaller in magnitude for prices
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Table 5: Homogeneous Trade Cost E¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln distance 0042
(0008)
¤¤¤ 0039
(0008)
¤¤¤ 0021
(0005)
¤¤¤ –
2 900  distance  7 700 – – – 0016
(0008)
¤
7 700  distance  14 200 – – – 0043
(0012)
¤¤¤
distance  14 200 – – – 0061
(0012)
¤¤¤
quality – 0032
(0001)
¤¤¤ – –
ln tari¤s ¡0115
(0040)
¤¤¤ ¡0113
(0040)
¤¤¤ ¡0086
(0022)
¤¤¤ ¡0079
(0022)
¤¤¤
ln remoteness 0048
(0013)
¤¤¤ 0047
(0013)
¤¤¤ 0011
(0008)
0013
(0008)
ln GDP ¡0024
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0024
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0013
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0014
(0002)
¤¤¤
ln GDP/cap 0020
(0007)
¤¤¤ 0021
(0007)
¤¤¤ 0011
(0005)
¤¤ 0007
(0005)
R-squared 0.584 0.596 0.838 0.838
Observations 91,307 91,307 71,952 71,952
Firm-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes No No
Product characteristics …xed e¤ects Yes Yes No No
Product-time …xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance at the one, …ve, and
ten percent levels.
Column (4) reports non-parametric estimates and regresses unit values on distance interval dummy
variables (the dummy for the …rst interval below 2,900 kilometers is omitted).21 Again, markups
rise with distance. Exporting to non-neighboring Latin American countries (between 2,900 and 7,700
kilometers) increases markups by 1.6 log points, on average. The e¤ect is equal to 4.3 log points for
the countries located between 7,700 and 14,200 kilometers away from Argentina, and to 6.1 log points
for the most distant destinations (above 14,200 kilometers). Higher tari¤s reduce markups.
4.2 Heterogeneous Trade Cost E¤ects
We now explore the heterogeneous e¤ects of bilateral distance and tari¤s on the markups of exports
di¤erentiated by quality. Column (1) of Table 6 includes an interaction term between distance and
quality, while column (2) also interacts tari¤s with quality. Consistent with Predictions 1 and 2,
the coe¢cient on the distance interaction is negative, while the coe¢cient on the tari¤ interaction is
positive. The elasticities of markups with respect to trade costs are therefore smaller in magnitude for
higher quality exports.22
(equations 9 and 11) than for markups (equations 10 and 12). We therefore compare the results for markups in column
(3) with the ones we obtain for prices if we regress the speci…cation in column (2) on the sample of column (3). The tari¤
elasticity is indeed smaller in magnitude at –0.072, while the distance elasticity is larger at 0.028.
21The …rst group (below 2,900 kilometers) includes Argentina’s neighboring countries. The second (2,900–7,700 kilome-
ters) contains other Latin American countries. The third (7,700–14,200 kilometers) includes the US, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. The last group (above 14,200 kilometers) contains Asian countries.
22Cavallo, Gopinath, Neiman, and Tang (2019) …nd that higher tari¤s reduce export prices to a larger extent for
undi¤erentiated than for di¤erentiated goods.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Trade Cost E¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln distance 0303
(0056)
¤¤¤ 0446
(0061)
¤¤¤ – –
ln distance £ quality ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s ¡0087
(0022)
¤¤¤ ¡1986
(0362)
¤¤¤ – –
ln tari¤s £ quality – 0022
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0027
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0022
(0005)
¤¤¤
ln remoteness 0012
(0008)
0011
(0008)
– –
ln GDP ¡0013
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0013
(0002)
¤¤¤ – –
ln GDP/cap 0010
(0005)
¤¤ 0010
(0005)
¤¤ – –
R-squared 0.838 0.838 0.922 0.909
Observations 71,952 71,952 66,941 69,219
Packaging Yes Yes Yes No
Product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi…cance at the one and …ve
percent levels. In (4), a product is de…ned according to a wine’s name, grape, type, and vintage year only.
How large are the heterogeneous e¤ects of trade costs? Based on the estimates of column (2),
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 plot the distance and tari¤ elasticities at each quality level in our sample
(between 55 and 97) and their con…dence intervals. At the mean value of quality (equal to 85), the
distance elasticity is equal to 0.022. It is equal to 0.052 at the 5 percentile of the quality distribution
(equal to 79), and falls to ¡0007 (which is insigni…cant) at the 95 percentile (equal to 91). Likewise,
the tari¤ elasticity is equal to ¡0094 at the mean value of quality. Its magnitude falls from ¡0227 at
the 5 percentile of the quality distribution to 0.039 (which is not signi…cant) at the 95 percentile.
For quality levels above 91, the distance elasticity becomes negative and the tari¤ elasticity positive.
The dampening e¤ect of quality thus outweighs the e¤ects of trade costs such that …rms lower their
markups in more distant markets, and raise them in high-tari¤ countries.
(a) Distance (b) Tari¤s
Figure 2: Bilateral distance and tari¤ elasticities by quality level (based on the estimates reported in column 2
of Table 6). 95 percent con…dence intervals reported as dashed lines.
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Column (3) reports the results of estimating equation (15). The coe¢cient on distance interacted
with quality remains negative, while the one on the interaction between tari¤s and quality is positive.
Finally, column (4) shows that our results remain robust if we de…ne a product according to a wine’s
name, grape, type, and vintage year only (and ignore its packaging type).
As we only observe unit values when a …rm exports to a given country, our regressions do not control
for the possibility that …rms may decide to export to some markets but not to others. By implementing
the three-step estimator of Harrigan et al. (2015), we show in Appendix D that our results remain
robust to removing selection bias across …rms. We explain export values using a two-step Heckman
estimator and we include the residuals as a selection control in the unit values regression.
4.3 Alternative Mechanisms
We consider alternative explanations to our mechanism which may explain the direct and heterogeneous
e¤ects of trade costs on markups.
4.3.1 Intensity of Competition
In our model, the substitution elasticity  determines the elasticity of demand to the CIF price, and it
therefore captures the degree of competition in foreign markets. It also a¤ects the price and markup
(equations 7 and 8). The model assumes that  is constant, but this may not be true in the data as
 could potentially vary across markets and quality levels. And for the goods with a lower  facing a
lower degree of competition, …rms can be expected to adjust their markups less in response to changes
in trade costs. Our estimates could hence be biased if a higher quality is associated with a lower .
To address this issue we estimate substitution elasticities across countries and quality levels. We
follow Imbs and Méjean (2015) who adapt Feenstra’s (1994) approach to estimate disaggregated sub-
stitution elasticities using trade data. Feenstra (1994) estimates a demand schedule for US industries
using country-industry …xed e¤ects as instruments. Identi…cation depends on the cross-section of ex-
porters and is achieved in deviation from a reference country. When this approach yields estimates that
do not match the theoretically plausible values for , Imbs and Méjean (2015) apply the grid search
algorithm of Broda and Weinstein (2006) that minimizes the sum of squared residuals over the intervals
of plausible values for , in which case the standard errors are boostrapped with 1,000 replications.
As we only observe one country exporting to many markets, to achieve identi…cation we de…ne each
exporting entity as a …rm. Besides, due to the small number of observations for “Great” and “Not
recommended” wines, we group our data into three quality categories: Low quality (which includes
the “Not recommended” and “Mediocre” wines), Medium quality (“Good” and “Very good” wines),
and High quality (“Great” and “Outstanding” wines). All wines within each category are therefore
assumed to be equally substitutable. Lastly, as the estimation requires us to observe lagged export
values and unit values, to maximize data coverage we aggregate our data at annual frequency. Due to
limited data coverage in 2002 and 2003 we restrict our estimation to the 2004–2009 period only.
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We provide two sets of estimates. First, we estimate one substitution elasticity for each of the three
quality categories, constraining them to be identical across importing countries. We …nd that  is equal
to 17.71 for Low quality, 11.82 for Medium quality, and to 8.37 for High quality. Higher quality wines
have a lower elasticity of substitution, and therefore face less competition in export markets. Second,
we let the three elasticities vary across destinations. This yields 75 di¤erent elasticities ranging from
1.41 to 41.73 with an average of 9.92 and a standard deviation of 9.27 (due to data limitations, we are
unable to estimate  for all countries and quality categories in our sample). A simple regression (with
…rm-time and product characteristics …xed e¤ects) shows that  falls with quality and tari¤s while it
increases with distance (all coe¢cients are signi…cant at the one percent level).
Table 7: Alternative Mechanisms: Intensity of Competition
(1) (2) (3)
ln distance 0415
(0083)
¤¤¤ – –
ln distance £ quality ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0002
(0001)
¤
ln distance £ ln 0027
(0006)
¤¤¤ ¡0002
(0009)
0076
(0024)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s ¡1673
(0523)
¤¤¤ – –
ln tari¤s £ quality 0023
(0006)
¤¤¤ 0025
(0006)
¤¤¤ 0010
(0005)
¤¤
ln tari¤s £ ln ¡0197
(0039)
¤¤¤ ¡0404
(0060)
¤¤¤ ¡0660
(0124)
¤¤¤
ln remoteness ¡0001
(0014)
– –
ln GDP ¡0024
(0003)
¤¤¤ – –
ln GDP/cap 0020
(0009)
¤¤ – –
ln ¡0200
(0049)
¤¤¤ 0102
(0075)
–
R-squared 0.845 0.928 0.922
Observations 49,129 44,806 66,941
Substitution elasticity varies by Country-quality Country-quality Quality
Product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance at the one, …ve, and
ten percent levels. The elasticity of substitution  is estimated using the Imbs and Méjean (2015) methodology.
In column (1) of Table 7 we estimate equation (14) but we further interact distance and tari¤s with
the (log) elasticity of substitution that varies across destinations and quality categories. The coe¢cient
on the interaction between distance and  is positive, while the one on the interaction between tari¤s
and  is negative. When trade costs increase, …rms adjust their markups less for the wines with a
lower , which also tend to have a higher quality. Most importantly, controlling for  does not a¤ect
our main conclusions: …rms raise their markups in more distant markets, lower them in high-tari¤
destinations, and these e¤ects are stronger for the wines of lower quality.23
23 If we include distance, tari¤s, quality, the substitution elasticity and the country controls as regressors (with …rm-time
and product characteristics …xed e¤ects), a variance decomposition shows that 2.71 percent of the variation in unit values
is explained by quality, 0.53 percent by the elasticity of substitution, 0.15 percent by distance, and 0.03 percent by tari¤s.
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In column (2) we further control for …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects. In column (3) we estimate
the same speci…cation as in column (2) but we use the substitution elasticities estimated by quality
category only. The coe¢cient on the interaction between distance and  turns insigni…cant in column
(2). But in both cases, the e¤ects of trade costs on markups continue to be heterogeneous across quality
levels. We thus conclude that the intensity of competition in foreign markets is not driving our results.
4.3.2 Country-level Characteristics
Our estimates could also be biased if distance and tari¤s are correlated with other country-level char-
acteristics a¤ecting the pricing decisions of exporters in each quality segment. For instance, Chen
and Juvenal (2016) show that the markups of higher quality exports are more sensitive to changes in
real exchange rates. To ensure that our results are not driven by the heterogeneous pricing-to-market
behavior of exporters, we control for the exchange rate between the US dollar and the destination’s
currency (an increase indicates an appreciation of the US dollar) interacted with quality. In column (1)
of Table 8, the coe¢cient on this interaction term is positive, but its inclusion does not substantially
modify the size and signi…cance of the coe¢cients on the distance and tari¤ interaction terms.
Table 8: Alternative Mechanisms: Country-level Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln distance £ quality ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0009
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s £ quality 0026
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0029
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0030
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0030
(0005)
¤¤¤ 0015
(0004)
¤¤¤
ln ER £ quality 0001
(0000)
¤¤ – – – –
ln GDP/cap £ quality – 0002
(0001)
¤¤¤ – – –
ln wine production/cap £ quality – – 0001
(0000)
¤¤ – –
ln wine consumption/cap £ quality – – – 0002
(0000)
¤¤¤ –
ln wine import share £ quality – – – – ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤
R-squared 0.922 0.922 0.924 0.925 0.922
Observations 66,941 66,941 56,605 44,410 66,939
Product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi…cance at the one and …ve
percent levels. An increase in the exchange rate “ER” indicates an appreciation of the US dollar.
In a related study, Chen and Juvenal (2018) show that the markups of higher quality exports are
more sensitive to changes in foreign income. In column (2) we therefore include an interaction between
foreign real GDP per capita and quality. The coe¢cient on the interaction term is positive, but distance
and tari¤s continue to have heterogeneous e¤ects on the markups of exports di¤erentiated by quality.
Finally, markups may depend on each country’s wine production or consumption patterns. In
columns (3) and (4) we therefore include interactions between quality and each country’s wine pro-
duction per capita (we use the logarithm of one plus wine production per capita to account for the
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countries not producing wine) or wine consumption per capita. As markups could also be a¤ected by
the intensity of wine import competition in each country, in column (5) we interact quality with each
country’s share of wine import quantities (HS 2204) from Argentina at annual frequency (from the
BACI data set). In all cases, the e¤ects of trade costs on markups remain heterogeneous across quality
levels (our results also remain robust to interacting remoteness or each country’s GDP with quality).
5 Extensions
This section discusses extensions. First, we investigate whether our results vary with the destination
country’s income level. Second, we explore whether our …ndings vary across di¤erent types of exporters.
Third, we extend our analysis to manufacturing industries other than wine. Finally, we derive and test
the predictions of our model for export volumes.
5.1 Income Heterogeneity across Destinations
Consumers in richer countries are generally assumed to have a stronger preference for higher quality
goods (Chen and Juvenal, 2016, 2018; Crinò and Epifani, 2012; Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman,
2011; Feenstra and Romalis, 2014; Hallak, 2006; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Simonovska, 2015). To
check if per capita income matters for our results, we classify countries as rich or poor based on
whether their income per capita is above or below the sample median. We estimate equation (15) and
we multiply the distance and tari¤ interactions with a dummy variable for the richer destinations.24
Table 9: Income Heterogeneity across Destinations
(1) (2)
ln distance £ quality ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤ ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln distance £ quality £ rich ¡0001
(0000)
¤ ¡0001
(0000)
¤¤
ln tari¤s £ quality 0004
(0005)
¡0007
(0009)
ln tari¤s £ quality £ rich 0036
(0007)
¤¤¤ 0038
(0009)
¤¤¤
Rich versus poor Median GDP/cap World Bank GNI
R-squared 0.922 0.922
Observations 66,941 66,941
Product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance at the one, …ve, and
ten percent levels.
The results are presented in column (1) of Table 9. The coe¢cient on the interaction of distance
with quality is signi…cant for the two groups of countries, but it is larger in magnitude for the richer
destinations. Instead, the e¤ect of tari¤s is heterogeneous for the richer markets only. Column (2) shows
24Argentina’s higher income export destinations such as the US and the EU also tend to be farther away. In our sample,
the correlation between income per capita and bilateral distance is equal to 60 percent.
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that our results remain similar if we instead split our sample using the World Bank’s classi…cation of
high and low income countries (the threshold is a GNI per capita of 4,035 US dollars in 2011). The
heterogeneous e¤ects of trade costs on markups are thus stronger for exports to richer destinations.
5.2 Firm-level Characteristics
We explore whether our results vary across exporters depending on their average quality, their size, and
their export market shares. To identify di¤erential e¤ects, we estimate equation (15) and we multiply
the distance and tari¤ interactions with a dummy variable for the higher quality …rms, the larger …rms,
and the exporters with larger export market shares.
First, to compare higher and lower quality exporters we divide our sample at the median of average
…rm-level quality. We de…ne a higher quality exporter as one which average quality is above the
median. As shown in column (1) of Table 10, the interactions of distance and tari¤s with quality are
only signi…cant for the higher quality …rms. Heterogeneity in the impact of trade costs on markups is
therefore driven by the higher quality exporters.
Table 10: Firm-level Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Firm quality Firm size Market shares
ln distance £ quality ¡0001
(0001)
0001
(0001)
¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln distance £ quality £ above median ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤ 0001
(0000)
ln tari¤s £ quality 0007
(0005)
0014
(0007)
¤¤ 0008
(0007)
ln tari¤s £ quality £ above median 0033
(0008)
¤¤¤ 0017
(0009)
¤¤ 0026
(0009)
¤¤¤
R-squared 0.922 0.922 0.922
Observations 66,941 66,941 66,941
Product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi…cance at the one and …ve
percent levels. The “above median” dummy variable indicates that average …rm-level quality, …rm size, or …rm export
market shares are above the sample median.
Second, we ask whether our results vary with …rm-level productivity. As more productive …rms tend
to charge higher markups (Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Warzynski, 2014; Berman et al., 2012; Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008), we expect those …rms to be better able to adjust their markups across countries
and quality levels in response to changes in trade costs. Missing any data on …rm-level value-added
or employment which are required to calculate productivity, we instead rely on a measure of …rm size
as the latter correlates strongly with productivity. We calculate the total volume (in liters) of exports
for each …rm in each year, and we divide our sample between large and small …rms based on whether
their total yearly exports are above or below the sample median. Column (2) shows that the e¤ect
of distance is heterogeneous for the large …rms only. The e¤ect of tari¤s is heterogeneous for the two
groups of …rms, but to a larger extent for the bigger …rms.
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Lastly, we compare …rms based on their export market shares. Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)
and Atkeson and Burstein (2008) argue that exporters have higher markups in the countries where
they own a large share of the market, making it easier to adjust their markups. We thus expect the
e¤ects of trade costs on markups to be more strongly heterogeneous for the high market share …rms.
We construct market shares as each …rm’s total exports as a share of the total value exported by all
…rms by destination and year. Relative to the median market share, we split the sample between high
and low market share …rms. Column (3) shows that the e¤ect of distance is equally heterogeneous for
the two groups of …rms. Instead, tari¤s have heterogeneous e¤ects for the high market share …rms only.
To sum up, the heterogeneous e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on markups are mainly driven by high
performance …rms: the larger …rms, with higher market shares and exporting a higher quality. Larger
…rms have higher market shares (the correlation is 0.69). The correlations between …rm-level quality,
on the one hand, and market shares and …rm size, on the other hand, are only equal to 0.09 and 0.10.
5.3 Manufacturing Industries
To demonstrate that our results for export prices generalize to industries other than wine, we rely on the
universe of Argentinean …rm-level exports (from Nosis). We observe the name of the exporter (identi…ed
as the …rst probable exporter reported by Nosis), the destination country, the transaction date, the 12-
digit HS code, the FOB value (in US dollars) and the mass (in kilograms) of exports between 2002 and
2009. We aggregate the data at quarterly frequency and unit values are in US dollars per kilogram. We
focus on manufacturing industries (HS 30–38 and 42–97, Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2016), and we de…ne
a product at the 8-digit HS level. This level of disaggregation thus prevents us from identifying the
variation in markups. Finally, we drop the observations for which the unit value exceeds 100 times the
median unit value per …rm-product-time, or falls below the median divided by 100.
As quality is unobserved, we follow Bernini and Tomasi (2015) who adapt the Khandelwal (2010)
procedure to estimate the quality of exports at the …rm-product-destination-time level (Chen and
Juvenal, 2018). See Appendix E for details. The e¤ectively applied weighted average tari¤ rates (in
percentage terms), obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development TRAINS
database, are reported at the 6-digit HS level and at annual frequency. Our sample includes 9,724
exporters, 3,155 products, and 92 destination countries (462,127 observations). As each product can
be exported by more than one …rm we now control for …rm-product-time …xed e¤ects.
The results in Table 11 provide strong evidence that our …ndings for export prices hold more
generally for manufacturing industries other than wine. Unit values rise with distance, income per
capita, and remoteness, and fall with a country’s size and tari¤s (column 1). Higher quality goods are
exported at a higher price (column 2). The magnitude of the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on unit
values is smaller for higher quality exports (column 3), and this …nding remains robust to controlling
for …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects (column 4).
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Table 11: Manufacturing Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln distance 0035
(0003)
¤¤¤ 0035
(0003)
¤¤¤ 0035
(0003)
¤¤¤ –
quality – 0037
(0002)
¤¤¤ 0056
(0008)
¤¤¤ 0062
(0010)
¤¤¤
ln distance £ quality – – ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤ ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s ¡0101
(0046)
¤¤ ¡0084
(0045)
¤ ¡0079
(0045)
¤ ¡0007
(0093)
ln tari¤s £ quality – – 0102
(0035)
¤¤¤ 0127
(0039)
¤¤¤
ln remoteness 0031
(0010)
¤¤¤ 0040
(0011)
¤¤¤ 0039
(0011)
¤¤¤ –
ln GDP ¡0028
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0028
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0028
(0002)
¤¤¤ –
ln GDP/cap 0035
(0006)
¤¤¤ 0028
(0006)
¤¤¤ 0029
(0006)
¤¤¤ –
R-squared 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.965
Observations 215,476 215,476 215,476 154,760
Firm-product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects No No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per kilogram). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance at the one, …ve, and
ten percent levels.
5.4 Export Volumes
Our model holds predictions for the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on exports across quality levels. Using
equations (5) and (6), the elasticities of export quantities  with respect to  and   are:
 =
¡³
1 + () 
´  0 (16)
 =
¡³
1 +
 
()
´  0 (17)
Quantities fall with  (and therefore with distance), especially for lower quality exports. Instead,
quantities fall with   (and thus with tari¤s), but to a larger extent for higher quality exports.25 To
investigate those predictions, we estimate the following reduced-form regression:
ln  = 1 ln  + 2 ln  £  + 3 ln  + 4 ln  £ 
+5 + +  (18)
where  is the export volume (in liters), and we expect 1 + (2 £ )  0 with 2  0, and
3+(4 £ )  0 with 4  0. As estimations that include positive trade ‡ows only su¤er from a
selection bias, we regress  by Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (Head and Mayer, 2014; Santos
25Exports fall with the CIF price (equation 5), and hence with distance and tari¤s (equation 6). Distance increases the
CIF price directly but also indirectly through the FOB price. As the FOB price rises less for higher quality goods, their
exports fall less compared to lower quality exports. Tari¤s increase the CIF price directly but also reduce it by lowering
the FOB price. As the FOB price falls less for higher quality goods, their exports fall more than lower quality exports.
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Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). We construct a balanced sample of all possible …rm-wine-destination-time
combinations that includes positive and zero trade ‡ows, and for each wine we drop the years prior to
its vintage year.
Table 12: Export Volumes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln distance ¡1036
(0069)
¤¤¤ ¡2399
(0372)
¤¤¤ – ¡0352
(0033)
¤¤¤ ¡0858
(0267)
¤¤¤ –
ln distance £ quality – 0016
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0018
(0006)
¤¤¤ – 0006
(0003)
¤ ¡0004
(0003)
ln tari¤s ¡2346
(0245)
¤¤¤ 8098
(2329)
¤¤¤ – ¡0394
(0158)
¤¤ 8632
(1631)
¤¤¤ –
ln tari¤s £ quality – ¡0124
(0028)
¤¤¤ ¡0219
(0028)
¤¤¤ – ¡0106
(0019)
¤¤¤ ¡0079
(0017)
¤¤¤
ln remoteness ¡0713
(0109)
¤¤¤ ¡0713
(0109)
¤¤¤ – ¡0084
(0056)
¡0081
(0056)
–
ln GDP 0737
(0019)
¤¤¤ 0737
(0019)
¤¤¤ – 0281
(0009)
¤¤¤ 0282
(0009)
¤¤¤ –
ln GDP/cap 0942
(0062)
¤¤¤ 0942
(0061)
¤¤¤ – 0413
(0034)
¤¤¤ 0413
(0034)
¤¤¤ –
R-squared – – – 0.555 0.555 0.778
Observations 2,472,069 2,472,069 421,691 71,952 71,952 66,941
Estimation PPML PPML PPML OLS OLS OLS
Zero observations included Yes Yes Yes No No No
Product-time …xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the FOB export volume (in liters) in (1) to (3), and the log FOB export volume in (4)
to (6). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate
signi…cance at the one, …ve, and ten percent levels.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 12 report PPML estimates. Export volumes fall with distance and
tari¤s (column 1). The magnitude of the distance elasticity falls with quality, while the magnitude of
the tari¤ elasticity increases with quality (column 2). This heterogeneity across quality levels remains
robust to including …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects (column 3). Besides, …rms export more to richer
and larger markets, and less to remote destinations. For comparison, columns (4) to (6) report OLS
estimates. The coe¢cients tend to be smaller in magnitude but their signs and signi…cance remain
similar (except for remoteness and for the interaction between distance and quality in column 6).
According to the estimates of column (2), at the mean, 5, and 95 percentiles of the quality
distribution, the distance elasticity is equal to ¡1040, ¡1142, and ¡0932, while the tari¤ elasticity
is equal to ¡2314, ¡1540, and ¡3147, respectively (all signi…cant at the one percent level).
6 Robustness
We report in Appendix F a number of robustness exercises on the estimation of equation (15). Overall,
the patterns we …nd are supportive of our main conclusions.
Table F1 reports results using di¤erent samples and speci…cations. Column (1) shows that our
results continue to hold once we include wholesalers and retailers in the sample (the share of wine
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exports handled by intermediaries is only equal to 4.80 percent in 2002 and to 5.33 percent in 2009).
As each wine can be exported by more than one …rm we now control for …rm-product-time …xed e¤ects.
In wine producing countries, wine producers may lobby for protectionism if import competition is
strong. Therefore, tari¤s may be endogenous. In column (2) we instrument the interaction of tari¤s
with quality with the (logarithm of one plus) each country’s total wine production interacted with
quality. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (equal to 83, Stock and Yogo, 2005) rejects the null of weak
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressor.
In December 2001, as Argentina was in the midst of a crisis, the government froze all bank accounts
and prohibited withdrawals from US dollar-denominated accounts. These measures lasted for a year
and the lack of cash availability caused numerous problems for businesses. The …xed exchange rate
was abandoned, leading to a large depreciation of the peso, and default was declared on most of the
country’s debt. To account for these events in column (3) we exclude the year 2002 from our sample.
The distance shipped by a given wine to a given country may vary depending on the port of exit
from Argentina. As our data set reports the port of exit for each wine, we construct a new sample
and we de…ne a wine product according to its name, grape, type, vintage year, packaging type, and
port of exit. As shown in column (4), controlling for the port of exit does not alter our conclusions.
In column (5) we control for export volumes and their interaction with quality. This addresses the
possibility that the pricing strategies of exporters depend on shipment size. In column (6) we compute
unit values at annual frequency as combining quarterly data for export prices with annual data on
tari¤s may downward bias the standard errors (Manova and Zhang, 2012). In column (7) we include
the small shipments with less than 4.5 liters in the sample.
Table F2 addresses the measurement of quality. In column (1) quality is measured using the Parker
ratings. In column (2) quality is rescaled to vary between one and six. Each value corresponds to
one the Wine Spectator bins (Table 1), and a larger value indicates a higher quality. Column (3)
excludes “Great” wines from the sample. Column (4) excludes the US from the sample because the
Wine Spectator (and Parker) is a US-based rating and may not capture taste preferences for quality
in other countries. As endogeneity could arise due to measurement error in the quality ratings (Chen
and Juvenal, 2016, 2018), in column (5) we use the Parker scores to instrument the Wine Spectator
ratings (both interacted with distance and tari¤s) under the assumption that their measurement errors
are uncorrelated. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (equal to 404, Stock and Yogo, 2005) rejects the
null of weak correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressors.
Based on the Khandelwal (2010) methodology (see Appendix E), we also estimate quality for each
12-digit HS-level wine product exported by each …rm to each country in each time period. Our sample
size more than doubles as many unrated wines can be included in the sample. As shown in column
(6), our results continue to hold. In column (7) we interact distance and tari¤s with both estimated
quality and the Wine Spectator ratings. The coe¢cients on both sets of interactions remain signi…cant
and with expected signs, although the ones on the interactions with estimated quality become less
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signi…cant. This …nding most likely re‡ects the fact that the Khandelwal (2010) measure embodies not
only quality but also consumer tastes.
To check if our results hold for both lower and higher quality wines, in column (8) we classify the
“Very good,” “Outstanding,” and “Great” wines as high quality, the “Not recommended,” “Mediocre,”
and “Good” ones as low quality, and we estimate di¤erent coe¢cients for the two quality categories.
Finally, in Table F3 we estimate the cross-sectional variation of our coe¢cients. We estimate
equation (14) and we interact the distance and tari¤ variables with year dummies. For the years 2004–
2009, markups rise with distance, fall with tari¤s, and these e¤ects are stronger in magnitude for lower
quality exports. The insigni…cant results for 2002 and 2003 could be due to the economic crisis of 2002
(see above), or to the poorer data coverage compared to the other years (see Table 2).
7 Concluding Remarks
Guided by the predictions of a model that features endogenous markups and per unit trade costs,
our paper is the …rst to provide robust empirical evidence that exporters adjust their markups across
destinations depending on trade costs such as distance and tari¤s. Firms raise their markups in
more distant markets, but lower them in high-tari¤ countries. Moreover, the e¤ects of trade costs on
markups are heterogeneous and are smaller in magnitude for higher quality exports. This heterogeneity
is stronger for exports to richer countries, and it is predominantly driven by the higher quality …rms,
the larger …rms, and the exporters with larger export market shares. As these high performance …rms
tend to charge higher markups, they are better able to adjust them across countries and quality levels
in response to changes in trade costs.
Our results are important because they show that the variation in …rm-level export prices across
markets is not only driven by quality di¤erences but also by markup variation conditional on quality.
Due to market power, …rms thus price discriminate across destinations, but the way and the extent to
which they do so depends on the size and on the nature of trade costs (i.e., per unit versus ad valorem),
and on the quality they export. Trade costs therefore play a key role in generating deviations from the
Law of One Price, and they thus matter in explaining the degree of international market segmentation.
And as our results are mainly driven by the high performance …rms that contribute to the bulk of
aggregate exports, they can be expected to matter in explaining aggregate export prices and markups.
Our …ndings imply that trade models assuming that markups are invariant to country-level charac-
teristics lack a key channel to explain the pricing strategies of exporters across international markets.
Our results therefore militate in favor of trade models featuring variable markups that depend on trade
costs. They also emphasize the importance of modelling trade costs more ‡exibly, and in particular
that accounting for per unit trade costs enables us to explain strong patterns observed in the data. We
believe that understanding the welfare implications of our results would be an important next step.26
26 Irarrazabal et al. (2015) and Lashkaripour (2017) show that the welfare gains from trade are larger in models with
per unit trade costs. Fan, Li, Xu, and Yeaple (2017) instead argue that they are lower.
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A Per Unit versus Ad Valorem Trade Costs
We provide evidence that both per unit and ad valorem trade costs are pervasive in our data. Also,
consistent with the premise that per unit trade costs increase with distance, we show that trade costs
become more per unit than ad valorem as distance increases.
First, to identify the nature of trade costs in our data, we estimate the following reduced-form
regression (Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Lashkaripour, 2017; Lugovskyy and Skiba, 2015):
ln  = 1 ln + 2 ln  + 3 ln  + + +  (A1)
where for each wine product  exported by …rm  to country  in quarter ,  are freight charges
divided by the volume exported (in US dollars per liter),  is the export unit value (in US dollars
per liter),  is the bilateral distance between Argentina and country , and  is shipment size (in
liters). We expect freight costs to increase with distance. Freight costs should also increase with export
prices as more expensive goods may require heavier packaging, more careful and costly handling, and
face higher insurance fees (Hummels and Skiba, 2004). Instead, freight costs should fall with shipment
size if there are scale economies in transportation (i.e., it should be less costly to export a large shipment
at once than many small shipments at di¤erent times).
The coe¢cient of interest is 1 as it captures the extent to which freight costs are ad valorem or
per unit. If freight costs are ad valorem only, they vary proportionally with export prices such that
1 = 1. If they are per unit only, they do not depend on export prices such that 1 = 0. An elasticity
1 between zero and unity in turn indicates that freight costs are both per unit and ad valorem, and
the smaller the elasticity, the larger the per unit component of freight costs. As we want to identify
the e¤ect of unit values (and not of markups) on freight costs, we include …rm-time  and product
characteristics  (grape, type, vintage year, HS-level, packaging, and province of origin) …xed e¤ects
(the results remain similar if we instead include product-time …xed e¤ects). Robust standard errors
are adjusted for clustering by destination-time.
One issue is that unit values and shipment size are endogenous to freight costs. Freight costs
rise with prices because of higher insurance or handling requirements, but prices increase with freight
costs if they have a per unit component (see equation 7), resulting in a positive endogeneity bias. We
therefore instrument, in each time period, the unit value of each wine product exported to a given
country with its mean unit value on exports to other destinations. The mean unit value is exogenous
by construction as it excludes the unit value to be instrumented. Besides, as the dependent variable
divides freight charges by the volume exported, it is negatively correlated with shipment size. We use
the destination’s GDP and GDP per capita to instrument export volumes (Hummels and Skiba, 2004).
Our data set reports freight charges (in US dollars) at the …rm-product-destination-time level. As
the coverage is very incomplete, the sample we use to estimate equation (A1) only includes 107 …rms,
1,440 wines (1,534 products), and 82 export markets between 2005Q4 and 2009Q4 (6,802 observations).
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Column (1) of Table A1 reports OLS estimates. Freight costs rise with distance and fall with export
volumes. They also increase with unit values and the elasticity is equal to 0758 (signi…cantly lower
than unity at the one percent level). Column (2) instruments unit values and the elasticity falls to 0713
(the OLS estimate in column 1 is therefore upward biased). Column (3) also instruments shipment
size and the unit value elasticity falls to 0667.27 Freight costs are thus both per unit and ad valorem.
Table A1: Per Unit versus Ad Valorem Trade Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln unit value 0758
(0032)
¤¤¤ 0713
(0043)
¤¤¤ 0667
(0048)
¤¤¤ 1285
(0299)
¤¤¤ 1659
(0304)
¤¤¤ 1512
(0304)
¤¤¤
ln distance 0062
(0031)
¤¤ 0069
(0030)
¤¤ 0068
(0030)
¤¤ 0152
(0058)
¤¤¤ 0228
(0062)
¤¤¤ 0210
(0062)
¤¤¤
ln unit value £ ln distance – – – ¡0059
(0034)
¤ ¡0107
(0035)
¤¤¤ ¡0096
(0035)
¤¤¤
ln export volume ¡0121
(0012)
¤¤¤ ¡0133
(0014)
¤¤¤ ¡0187
(0022)
¤¤¤ ¡0120
(0012)
¤¤¤ ¡0132
(0014)
¤¤¤ ¡0186
(0022)
¤¤¤
Unit value elasticities
Mean – – – 0756
(0033)
¤¤¤ 0702
(0043)
¤¤¤ 0656
(0048)
¤¤¤
5 percentile – – – 0810
(0039)
¤¤¤ 0800
(0045)
¤¤¤ 0744
(0049)
¤¤¤
95 percentile – – – 0702
(0051)
¤¤¤ 0604
(0061)
¤¤¤ 0569
(0065)
¤¤¤
R-squared 0.660 0.299 0.287 0.660 0.301 0.289
Observations 6,706 5,116 5,116 6,706 5,116 5,116
Estimation OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Kleibergen-Paap F – 346.35 196.90 – 143.25 147.73
Notes: The dependent variable is the log freight cost per liter exported (in US dollars per liter). Firm-time and product
characteristics (grape, type, vintage year, HS-level, packaging, and province of origin) …xed e¤ects are included. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance at
the one, …ve, and ten percent levels. In (2), (3), (5), and (6), unit values are instrumented with mean unit values. In (5)
and (6), the interaction term is instrumented with mean unit values interacted with distance. In (3) and (6), shipment
size is instrumented with the destination’s GDP and GDP per capita.
Second, we follow Lugovskyy and Skiba (2015) and we add to equation (A1) an interaction term
between unit values and distance. If freight costs become more per unit than ad valorem at longer
distances, the coe¢cient on the interaction term should be negative.
Column (4) reports OLS results, and the coe¢cient on the interaction term is negative. It remains
negative once we instrument unit values and the interaction term with mean unit values and their
interaction with distance (column 5), and when we also instrument shipment size (column 6). Therefore,
freight costs become more per unit than ad valorem at longer distances. At the mean value of distance,
the unit value elasticity in column (6) is equal to 0656. It is equal to 0744 at the 5 percentile of
the distance distribution, and falls to 0569 at the 95 percentile (all elasticities are signi…cantly lower
than unity at the one percent level). Based on the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic, we reject in columns
(5) and (6) the null of weak correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressors.
27Unit values increase with mean unit values while shipment size increases with GDP and GDP per capita. The
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic rejects the null of weak correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressors.
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B Alternative Demand Systems
Irarrazabal et al. (2015) predict that higher per unit trade costs reduce the magnitude of the elasticity
of demand to the FOB price , especially among low-price …rms. They investigate whether this
mechanism holds for di¤erent demand systems. We review their …ndings and we extend their analysis
to examine how  varies with ad valorem trade costs and the FOB price.
As in Irarrazabal et al. (2015), consider a general demand system for di¤erentiated goods (Arkolakis,
Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2019). All consumers have the same preferences. For a
consumer with income  facing a vector of prices p, her Marshallian demand for any good is:
ln 
³
  ¤ 
´
= ¡ ln  +  ln  + 
³
ln  ¡ ln ¤
´
 (B1)
where  and  are quantity and CIF price,  =  +  where  is the FOB price and  and
 are the ad valorem and per unit components of trade costs, respectively, and ¤ (p) is a price index
which is symmetric in all prices p. All other prices therefore a¤ect demand only through their e¤ect
on the price aggregator ¤. Denoting  = ln  ¡ ln ¤  0, this framework encompasses four di¤erent
utility functions that have been widely used in the literature: (a) CES utility, in which case  =  = 1
and  () = (1 ¡ ) ; (b) quadratic, non-separable utility (Ottaviano et al., 2002), in which case  = 0,
 = ¡1, and  () = ¡ ln2 + ln (¡ ¡ 1); (c) translog preferences (Feenstra, 2003), in which case
 =  = 1 and  () = ln  + ln (¡); and (d) additively quasi-separable utility (Behrens and Murata,
2007), in which case  =  = 0 and  () = ln  + ln (¡) 
B.1 Per Unit Trade Costs
For all four demand systems, Irarrazabal et al. (2015) calculate the elasticity of demand with respect
to the FOB price  for  = 0 or   0. As shown in rows (1) and (2) of Table B1, whether  = 0
or   0 all demand systems yield   0.
In a next step, they derive the elasticity of  with respect to per unit trade costs. As shown in
row (3), this elasticity is negative with CES, translog, and additively quasi-separable utility (for some
values of ), while it is positive with quadratic preferences. Row (4) shows that the elasticity of 
with respect to per unit trade costs is in all cases increasing with the FOB price. See Irarrazabal et al.
(2015) for the full derivations. We discuss the implications of these …ndings further below.
B.2 Ad Valorem Trade Costs
We extend the analysis to the case of ad valorem trade costs. In rows (5) and (6) of Table B1, we
calculate  for  = 1 or   1, respectively, assuming that   0. Whether  = 1 or   1, all
demand systems yield   0.28
28The elasticities in rows (2) and (6) both correspond to the case where   0 and   1 and they are hence identical.
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The prediction that export prices fall with ad valorem trade costs, especially for low-price/low-
quality exports, requires the elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs to be positive
and decreasing with the FOB price. For each demand system, we calculate the elasticity of  with
respect to ad valorem trade costs and we determine its sign. We then show how this elasticity changes
with the FOB price. Rows (7) and (8) of Table B1 provide a summary of our results.
CES preferences The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs is:




=

 + 
 0 (B2)
and it decreases with the FOB price:


µ




¶
=
¡
( +  )
2  0 (B3)
Quadratic, non-separable utility The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs is:




=
 ¡ ¤
 ¡ ¤  0 (B4)
because  ¡ ¤  0 as  = ln  ¡ ln ¤  0, and  ¡ ¤  ¡  0 as ln  ¡ ln ¤ =
ln
¡
 + 
¢ ¡ ln ¤  0.
The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs increases with the FOB price:


µ




¶
=
¡ ( ¡ ¤) 
( ¡ ¤ +  )2  0 (B5)
because ¡ ( ¡ ¤)   0 as  ¡ ¤  0.
Translog preferences The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs is:




=
2 ¡  + 
¡ (1 ¡ )  0 (B6)
We know that ¡ (1 ¡ )  0 because   0. In the numerator, the roots of 2 ¡  +  are³
 §
p
 2 ¡ 4
´
2 . As the function is strictly convex, it is always positive for   0 whether
the discriminant is positive (two positive roots), negative (no real roots), or zero (one positive root).
The numerator of (B6) is therefore positive.
The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs decreases with the FOB price. By the
chain rule we know that:


µ




¶
=


µ




¶




 (B7)
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As  = 1  0 and  =   0, the sign of this derivative depends on the sign
of ()
¡¡

¢ ¡

¢¢
. From (B6) we know that the denominator of
¡

¢ ¡

¢
is
always positive, and as the function in the numerator is strictly convex and reaches its minimum in
the positive domain for  = 05, it follows that ()
¡¡

¢ ¡

¢¢
 0 for   0. The sign of
the derivative in (B7) is therefore negative.
Additively quasi-separable utility The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs
is:




=
 ¡ 
¡  0 (B8)
because ¡  0 and  ¡   0 as   0.
The elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs changes with the FOB price according
to:


µ




¶
=
¡ ¡2 +  ¡ ¢
(¡ ln  + ln ¤)2 ( +  )2  (B9)
In the numerator, the roots of 2+¡ are
³
¡ §
p
 2 + 4
´
2 . As   0, the relevant
root is
³
¡ ¡
p
 2 + 4
´
2 . As the function is strictly convex, the numerator of (B9) is
positive for
³
¡ ¡
p
 2 + 4
´
2    0, and negative for  
³
¡ ¡
p
 2 + 4
´
2 .
To sum up,
1. The prediction that prices and markups increase with distance requires
¡

¢ ¡

¢
 0.
This condition is satis…ed with CES. It also holds with translog and additively quasi-separable
utility (for some values of ). It is not satis…ed with quadratic preferences.
2. The prediction that the e¤ect of distance on prices and markups is smaller in magnitude for
higher price (and higher quality) exports requires
¡

¢ ¡¡

¢ ¡

¢¢
 0. This
condition holds in all cases.
3. The prediction that prices and markups fall with tari¤s requires
¡

¢ ¡

¢
 0. This
condition holds for all demand systems.
4. The prediction that the e¤ect of tari¤s on prices and markups is smaller in magnitude for higher
price (and higher quality) exports requires
¡

¢ ¡¡

¢ ¡

¢¢
 0. This condition
is satis…ed with CES, translog, and additively quasi-separable utility (for some values of ). It is
not satis…ed with quadratic preferences.
In other words, our predictions that (1) export prices and markups increase with distance, (2) fall
with tari¤s, (3) and to a larger extent for lower quality exports hold with CES, and with translog
and additively quasi-separable utility (for some parameter values only). Models with quadratic, non-
separable utility can yield some, but not all, of our predictions.
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Table B1: Alternative Demand Systems
CES Quadratic Translog Quasi-separable
Per unit trade cost 
(1)  =  ln 
 ln 
j=0 ¡  0 ¡ 1¡¡1  0 1¡  0 1  0
(2)  =  ln 
 ln 
j0 ¡
³
1 ¡ 

´
 0 ¡ 1¡¡1
³
1 ¡ 

´
 0 1¡
³
1 ¡ 

´
 0 1
³
1 ¡ 

´
 0
(3) 



  0  0
 0  1¡
p
5
2    0
 0    1¡
p
5
2
 0    ¡1
 0  ¡ 1    0
(4) 

³




´
 0  0  0  0
Ad valorem trade cost 
(5)  =  ln 
 ln 
j=1 ¡
³

+
´
 0 ¡ 1¡¡1
³

+
´
 0 1¡
³

+
´
 0 1
³

+
´
 0
(6)  =  ln  ln  j1 ¡
³
1 ¡ 
´
 0 ¡ 1¡¡1
³
1 ¡ 
´
 0 1¡
³
1 ¡ 
´
 0 1
³
1 ¡ 
´
 0
(7) 




 0  0  0  0
(8) 
³




´
 0  0  0
 0   
¡¡
p
 2+4
2
 0 
¡¡
p
2+4
2    0
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C Elasticity of Demand to the FOB Price
Equation (13) predicts that the elasticity of  with respect to per unit trade costs is negative and
increases with quality. It also predicts that the elasticity of  with respect to ad valorem trade costs
is positive and decreases with quality. To determine whether the two mechanisms hold in our data we
estimate (Irarrazabal et al., 2015):
ln  = ª[ln £ ln £ ] + ¨ [ln £ ln  £ ] + + (C1)
where  is the export volume (in liters) of wine product  exported by …rm  to country  in quarter
. We include a full set of interactions between unit values, bilateral distance as a proxy for per unit
trade costs, and quality. We also include a full set of interactions between unit values, tari¤s as a proxy
for ad valorem trade costs, and quality. The vectors of estimated coe¢cients are denoted by ª and
¨, respectively.2930 We control for …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects , and robust standard errors
are adjusted for clustering at the destination-time level. The demand elasticity  is given by:
 =
 ln 
 ln
= ª1 + ª2 ln + ª3 + ª4 ln  £  + ¨2 ln 
+ ¨4 ln  £  (C2)
We expect ª2  0, re‡ecting that distance increases the negative  (i.e.,  approaches zero), and
ª4  0, showing that the e¤ect of distance on  is smaller for higher quality exports. Likewise we
expect ¨2  0, capturing that tari¤s decrease the negative  (i.e.,  becomes more negative), and
¨4  0 such that the e¤ect of tari¤s on  is smaller for higher quality exports.
To address the endogeneity of unit values in equation (C1) we instrument, in each time period, the
unit value of each wine product exported to a given country with its mean unit value on exports to
other destinations (see Irarrazabal et al., 2015, and Appendix A). The mean unit value is exogenous
by construction as it excludes the unit value to be instrumented. We also instrument the interaction
terms involving unit values with the same interaction terms but with mean unit values.
The results are reported in Table C1. Column (1) reports OLS estimates, while in column (2)
we instrument unit values and their interactions. Consistent with expectations, the coe¢cient ª2
on the interaction between unit values and distance is positive, while the coe¢cient ª4 on the triple
interaction between unit values, distance, and quality is negative. Also, the coe¢cient ¨2 on the
interaction between unit values and tari¤s is negative, while the coe¢cient ¨4 on the triple interaction
between unit values, tari¤s, and quality is positive.
29 Instead of quality, Irarrazabal et al. (2015) include a dummy variable for the high-price …rms. Also, they only include
a full set of interactions between unit values, distance, and the high-price …rms dummy variable.
30 If we include a full set of interactions between unit values, distance, tari¤s, and quality, the coe¢cients on the
interaction terms that involve both distance and tari¤s are insigni…cant and our conclusions remain similar.
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Table C1: Elasticity of Demand to the FOB Price
(1) (2)
ln unit value ¡15209
(4328)
¤¤¤ ¡11024
(4105)
¤¤¤
quality ¡0124
(0061)
¤¤ ¡0065
(0073)
ln unit value £ quality 0153
(0046)
¤¤¤ 0106
(0046)
¤¤
ln unit value £ ln distance (ª2) 2115
(0498)
¤¤¤ 1457
(0494)
¤¤¤
ln unit value £ ln tari¤s (¨2) ¡9186
(3637)
¤¤ ¡6173
(3683)
¤
ln distance £ quality 0019
(0007)
¤¤¤ 0015
(0009)
¤
ln tari¤s £ quality ¡0233
(0060)
¤¤¤ ¡0177
(0059)
¤¤¤
ln unit value £ ln distance £ quality (ª4) ¡0023
(0005)
¤¤¤ ¡0016
(0006)
¤¤¤
ln unit value £ ln tari¤s £ quality (¨4) 0106
(0040)
¤¤¤ 0068
(0040)
¤
R-squared 0.566 0.076
Observations 87,078 58,646
Estimation OLS IV
Kleibergen-Paap F – 178.76
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB export volume (in liters). Firm-destination-time …xed e¤ects are included.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance
at the one, …ve, and ten percent levels. In (2), unit values (and their interactions) are instrumented with mean unit values
(and their interactions).
The elasticities of  with respect to distance and tari¤s are given by:




=
1

(ª2 + ª4 £ )  (C3)




=
1

(¨2 + ¨4 £ )  (C4)
To determine the sign and the magnitude of the two expressions, both for lower and for higher
quality exports, we use the estimates reported in Table C1 and we rely on equation (C2) to calculate
 at the 5 and 95 percentiles of the quality distribution (using the mean values of log distance
and tari¤s in our sample).
Based on the OLS estimates of column (1), the elasticity of  with respect to distance is equal
to ¡0454, ¡1416, and ¡0098 at the mean, 5, and 95 percentiles of the quality distribution. The
elasticity of  with respect to tari¤s is equal to 0346 at the mean value of quality, and falls from
3349 at the 5 percentile to ¡0761 (and therefore turns negative) at the 95 percentile.
Using the IV estimates of column (2), the elasticity of  with respect to distance is equal to
¡0137, ¡0280, and ¡0033 at the mean, 5, and 95 percentiles of the quality distribution, while
the elasticity of  with respect to tari¤s is equal to 0445, 1037, and 0012, respectively. The elasticity
of  with respect to distance is therefore negative and increases with quality. Instead, the elasticity
of  with respect to tari¤s is positive and decreases with quality.
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D Selection Bias across Firms
To remove selection bias across …rms, we implement the three-step estimator of Harrigan et al. (2015).
We construct a balanced sample of all possible …rm-wine-destination-time combinations that includes
positive and zero trade ‡ows, and for each wine we drop the years prior to its vintage year.
In a …rst step we estimate the probability of entry using a reduced-form probit:
 (  0) = © (1 ln +)  (D1)
where  is the export value,  includes distance, tari¤s, GDP, GDP per capita, and remoteness
(distance and tari¤s can also be interacted with quality), and  are product-time …xed e¤ects. From
equation (D1) we obtain the estimated inverse Mills ratio b. In a second step we estimate by OLS
a regression for positive export values with b included as an additional regressor:
ln = 1 ln + 2b + +  (D2)
and we calculate the quasi-residuals b = b2b +b = ln ¡ b1 ln ¡ b. In the …nal
step we add b as a selection control in the regression for unit values:
ln = 1 ln + 2b + +  (D3)
Equations (D1) and (D2) are estimated separately for each wine (and, therefore, only include time
…xed e¤ects), while equation (D3) is regressed on the pooled sample including all wines.31
The results of the three-step selection correction procedure, with third-stage standard errors clus-
tered by destination-time, are reported in Table D1.32 The samples are slightly smaller compared to
the ones we use for our main regressions because some …rst-stage probit regressions fail to converge.
In all columns, the positive coe¢cient on the selection control implies that the correlation between
the errors of the export price and of the export value regressions is around four percent. As explained
by Harrigan et al. (2015), a positive correlation suggests that destination-speci…c demand shocks are
likely to be more important than supply shocks in explaining which markets …rms decide to enter. But
most importantly, controlling for selection yields results which are both economically and statistically
similar to our benchmark …ndings. Whether we measure distance as a continuous variable or using
interval dummy variables, markups increase with bilateral distance, remoteness, and the destination’s
income per capita, and decrease with tari¤s and country size (columns 1 and 2). In column (1), a
doubling of distance induces an exporter to increase its markup by 2.3 percent on average.
31The estimates of the probit regressions (D1) may be biased due to the inclusion of time …xed e¤ects. To address this
issue we also estimated equations (D1) and (D2) separately for each wine in each quarter. Our results remain similar.
32Due to the …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects, controlling for selection in equation (15) is computationally infeasible as
this would require us to estimate the …rst-step probit using our full sample with more than 700,000 …xed e¤ects included.
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Table D1: Selection Bias
(1) (2) (3)
ln distance 0033
(0006)
¤¤¤ – 0535
(0070)
¤¤¤
2 900  distance  7 700 – 0045
(0009)
¤¤¤ –
7 700  distance  14 200 – 0071
(0014)
¤¤¤ –
distance  14 200 – 0080
(0017)
¤¤¤ –
ln distance £ quality – – ¡0006
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s ¡0135
(0035)
¤¤¤ ¡0130
(0031)
¤¤¤ ¡1494
(0449)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s £ quality – – 0016
(0005)
¤¤¤
ln remoteness 0046
(0011)
¤¤¤ 0041
(0011)
¤¤¤ 0046
(0011)
¤¤¤
ln GDP ¡0017
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0016
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0017
(0002)
¤¤¤
ln GDP/cap 0019
(0006)
¤¤¤ 0014
(0006)
¤¤ 0019
(0006)
¤¤¤
selection control 0044
(0007)
¤¤¤ 0043
(0008)
¤¤¤ 0044
(0007)
¤¤¤
R-squared 0.785 0.784 0.785
Observations 66,785 66,578 66,785
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Product-time …xed e¤ects
are included. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ indicate
signi…cance at the one and …ve percent levels. Estimates are obtained using the three-step procedure of Harrigan et al.
(2015).
Column (3) shows that the e¤ects of distance and tari¤s on markups are smaller in magnitude for
higher quality exports. At the mean, 5, and 95 percentiles of the quality distribution, the distance
elasticity is equal to 0.035, 0.071, and 0.001 (which is insigni…cant), while the tari¤ elasticity is equal to
¡0140, ¡0238, and ¡0047 (which is not signi…cant). Our results are therefore robust to controlling
for selection bias across …rms. Harrigan et al. (2015) …nd that removing selection bias leads to slightly
smaller coe¢cients on distance, but they also conclude that the di¤erence is negligible.
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E Estimation of Quality
We follow Bernini and Tomasi (2015) who adapt the Khandelwal (2010) procedure to estimate the
quality of exports at the …rm-product-destination-time level. The quality of an exported product is
the part of its market share in a destination country that is not explained by its price. We estimate:
ln ¡ ln = 1 + 2 ln + + +  (E1)
where  is the market share of product  exported by …rm  to country  in period ,  is the
market share of an “outside variety” ,  is the “nest share,”  is the export unit value, and
 and  are destination-time and …rm-product …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are adjusted
for clustering by destination-time.
We construct each variable as follows. First, using the export value  (in US dollars) and
quantity  (in kilograms) of each 8-digit HS-level product  exported by …rm  to destination 
in quarter  between 2002Q1 and 2009Q4 (from Nosis), we calculate unit values  (in US dollars
per kilogram). Second, we use annual frequency data between 2002 and 2009 from the BACI data
set to calculate the outside variety share  as the share of non-Argentinean import quantities (in
kilograms) in the total import quantities of country  in a 6-digit HS-level product category  (Bernini
and Tomasi, 2015).33 We match the outside variety share (at annual frequency) with the quarterly
data from Nosis by year to calculate the market share  and the nest share  as:
 =
P
  (1 ¡ )
 (E2)
 =
P
  (1 ¡ )
 (E3)
where  and  are de…ned at the 8-digit and 6-digit HS levels (the denominators of E2 and E3
are proxies for each HS-level market size).
To address the endogeneity of unit values and of the nest shares, we use the Nosis data to construct
the same instruments as Bernini and Tomasi (2015). We instrument unit values with the mean unit
value of each 8-digit HS-level product by destination-time, and the nest shares with the number of 8-
digit HS-level products by …rm-destination-time. We estimate equation (E1) separately for each 2-digit
HS-level category. The quality of product  exported by …rm  to country  in period  is obtained as:
 = b + b + b = [ln ¡ ln] ¡ hb1 + b2 lni  (E4)
This procedure allows us to estimate the quality of each 8-digit HS-level product exported by each …rm
to each destination country between 2002Q1 and 2009Q4. We also follow the same approach in Section
6 to estimate the quality of wine exports.
33The BACI data set reconciles the declarations of importers and exporters reported in UN Comtrade (Gaulier and
Zignago, 2010). The data are disaggregated at the 6-digit HS level.
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F Robustness
Table F1: Robustness on Samples and Speci…cations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln distance £ quality ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0005
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s £ quality 0028
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0033
(0013)
¤¤ 0027
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0025
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0024
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0023
(0006)
¤¤¤ 0026
(0004)
¤¤¤
ln export volume – – – – 0088
(0040)
¤¤ – –
ln export volume £ quality – – – – ¡0001
(0000)
¤¤ – –
Observations 67,105 56,605 64,884 63,743 66,941 53,197 71,466
Sample Retailers Full 2002 Ports Full Annual Less 4.5l
Estimation OLS IV OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi…cance at the one and …ve percent
levels. Firm-product-time and …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects are included in (1). Product-time and …rm-destination-
time …xed e¤ects are included in (2) to (7). In (2), the interaction between tari¤s and quality is instrumented with (log)
total wine production interacted with quality. In (6), the time dimension for the …xed e¤ects and the clustering is annual.
To save space, the R-squared are not reported but are available upon request.
Table F2: Robustness on Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln distance £ quality ¡0007
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡0019
(0004)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡0009
(0003)
¤¤¤ – ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤¤ –
ln tari¤s £ quality 0046
(0011)
¤¤¤ 0113
(0018)
¤¤¤ 0027
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0020
(0004)
¤¤¤ 0061
(0015)
¤¤¤ – 0028
(0004)
¤¤¤ –
ln distance £ quality – – – – – ¡0025
(0010)
¤¤¤ ¡0029
(0014)
¤¤ –
ln tari¤s £ quality – – – – – 0119
(0037)
¤¤¤ 0127
(0073)
¤ –
quality – – – – – 0200
(0087)
¤¤ 0213
(0111)
¤ –
ln distance £ quality – – – – – – – ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤
ln distance £ quality – – – – – – – ¡0003
(0001)
¤¤
ln tari¤s £ quality – – – – – – – 0042
(0007)
¤¤¤
ln tari¤s £ quality – – – – – – – 0040
(0006)
¤¤¤
Observations 33,448 66,941 66,813 57,113 33,448 125,112 64,713 66,941
Sample Full Full No “Great” No US Full Full Full Full
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Quality Parker WS [1,6] WS WS WS Est. Est./WS WS
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate signi…cance at the one, …ve, and
ten percent levels. Product-time and …rm-destination-time …xed e¤ects are included. “WS” refers to the Wine Spectator
quality ratings. In (5), the Wine Spectator ratings are instrumented with the Parker ratings (both interacted with distance
and tari¤s). In (6) and (7), quality is estimated using the Khandelwal (2010) methodology (see Appendix E). “Est.”
indicates that quality is estimated. In (8), quality and quality indicate high and low quality, respectively. To save
space, the R-squared are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table F3: Cross-Sectional Estimates
ln distance ln distance £ quality ln tari¤s ln tari¤s £ quality
Year 2002 0159
(0269)
¡0001
(0003)
1815
(1132)
¡0021
(0014)
Year 2003 0356
(0328)
¡0004
(0004)
¡0605
(2090)
0005
(0025)
Year 2004 0951
(0195)
¤¤¤ ¡0011
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡3812
(0985)
¤¤¤ 0045
(0012)
¤¤¤
Year 2005 0655
(0166)
¤¤¤ ¡0007
(0002)
¤¤¤ ¡2866
(0931)
¤¤¤ 0033
(0011)
¤¤¤
Year 2006 0310
(0153)
¤¤ ¡0004
(0002)
¤¤ ¡1943
(0690)
¤¤¤ 0022
(0008)
¤¤¤
Year 2007 0382
(0118)
¤¤¤ ¡0004
(0001)
¤¤¤ ¡2069
(0845)
¤¤ 0023
(0010)
¤¤
Year 2008 0337
(0136)
¤¤ ¡0004
(0002)
¤¤ ¡2202
(0877)
¤¤ 0024
(0010)
¤¤
Year 2009 0438
(0167)
¤¤¤ ¡0005
(0002)
¤¤ ¡2378
(0943)
¤¤ 0027
(0011)
¤¤
Observations 71,952
Notes: The dependent variable is the log FOB unit value of exports (in US dollars per liter). Product-time …xed e¤ects
are included. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by destination-time between parentheses. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ indicate
signi…cance at the one and …ve percent levels. GDP, GDP per capita, and remoteness are included but not reported.
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